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CRISIS IN YUGOSLAV PUBLIC LAW 
PETAR TEOFILOVIC· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Writing about the crisis in Yugoslavia is a challenge indeed. The crisis is 
overwhelming, penetrating almost every aspect of social life, and 
affecting the majority of citizens on a personal level in many unpleasant 
ways. Fluctuations in its intensity and breadth occur, sometimes for 
better, but usually for worse. Politics, economy, internal ethnic and civic 
relations, relations with the rest of the world, even science, culture, arts, 
morale are all severely affected by the crisis, and have significantly 
deteriorated in comparison with the state of affairs (far from perfect 
itself) that existed in Yugoslavia until the beginning of the 1990's. The 
ways of ruling, and the functioning of the state's agencies, have been 
continually distorted, gradually becoming more and more absolutist, 
presenting in many respects a disturbing deviation from most standards 
accepted by the majority of the modem world. The crisis has been a 
substantial part of contemporary Yugoslavia since the state emerged in 
its present shape in 1991, and has persisted. 
The domain of law, and public law in particular, has not been immune to 
the devastating effects of the sweeping and ongoing social crisis. A 
comprehensive picture of the state of Yugoslav public law would 
naturally require a much longer article. Thus, this paper will cover two 
of the most illustrative aspects in this domain: the crises in the federal 
order and in the media. 
* Ph.D. Candidate, Central European University (CEU), Legal Studies Department, 
Budapest, Hungary; LL.M., Comparative Constitutional Law, CEU, 1997; LL.M. Criminal Law, 
Belgrade School of Law, 1993; Graduated from Novi Sad School of Law in 1986 and from Novi Sad 
School of Philosophy, Department for Psychology in 1996. The author would like to thank 
Professor Dr. Nenad Dimitrijevic for finding time to discuss some issues with him. 
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Section II contains, as background, a brief outline of the federal 
arrangement of Yugoslavia; how it was established and its most 
important features. It also contains basic information about the political 
context in contemporary Yugoslavia. Section ill deals with the 
development of the crisis of Yugoslav federalism. Section IV presents 
an overview of the current state of lack of freedom of the press. The 
abuses of the regime have been most flagrant and long-lasting in this 
area, since resistance to the regime has been highly vocal in the media. 
The conclusion to this paper updates the events described and attempts to 
project future developments. 
II. BASIC INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE 
FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA 
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAIN INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF 
YUGOSLAV FEDERALISM 
It is important to have some understanding of the federal structure of the 
country as a background-to understanding the crisis in Yugoslav law. 
Until the disintegration in 1991, the Socialist Federative Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SPRY) was a federation consisting of six member-states 
(republics) and two autonomous provinces. According to the 1974 
federal Constitution of SPRY, the last in force before the dissolution of 
the country, all these units, the republics as well as the provinces, were 
the constitutive elements of the federation. Both provinces were formed 
on the territory of the Socialist Republic of Serbia - Vojvodina in the 
north and Kosovo in the south. The 1974 federal Constitution, as well as 
the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia of 1974, provided for 
a very high level of autonomy for the provinces, which in many respects 
made their status equal with that of the republics. 
The events at the end of the 1980's and early 1990's wrought many 
controversies on the federal level and within the federal units concerning 
the then federal arrangement of Yugoslavia. One of the characteristics of 
that period was the eruption of nationalism throughout the country. 
Some proposals for a new constitutional arrangement were introduced, 
but in the existing political setting none of them seemed good enough to 
the political elites. Tensions were high; provocations and armed clashes 
started shortly thereafter. As a result, SPRY split in 1991 and the wars 
for the territories began, ending after the Dayton Peace Accord in 1995. 
After this dissolution of SPRY, five new states emerged. Four of them 
are former republics of Yugoslavia that had gained independence. The 
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fifth, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), is the one discussed in 
this paper. 
In 1990, during the disturbances that were going on before the country 
split, the Constitution of Serbia was amended to introduce many changes 
to the previous constitutional order. The constitution of the former 
Yugoslavia (SFRY), effectively abolished after the country's breakup, 
was formally replaced by a new one enacted in April 1992. It established 
FRY as a federation consisting of two remaining federal units from the 
former Yugoslavia - the Republic of Serbia (including both provinces) 
and the Republic of Montenegro.! The latter enacted its new constitution 
in October 1992. Therefore, the present constitutional system of FRY 
incorporates three constitutions. 
These constitutions were drafted in a very short period of time, by a 
small circle of politicians and legal experts loyal to the regime. No 
material public debate was conducted on the issues addressed or on the 
solutions and formulations proposed. The current Constitution of Serbia 
was enacted by the still single-party Serbian Parliament (consisting of 
deputies of the members of the former League of Communists) before 
the first multiparty elections in more than half a century introduced 
plurality and opposition, however rudimentary, into the parliament? As 
for the Montenegrin Constitution enacted by its multiparty legislative 
body, controversies and opposition in parliament were easily ignored by 
the ruling party's majority, and the proposed text was ratified without 
much debate.3 Finally, the federal Constitution was a result of an 
arrangement between the ruling parties of Serbia (Socialist Party of 
Serbia) and Montenegro (DPS).4 
1. CONST. OF THE FEDERAL REpUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, art. 2, § 1 [hereinafter CONST. OF 
FRY]. English translation of the CaNST. OF FRY can be found, inter alia, on Internet at 
<http://www.uni-wuerzburg.dellaw/srt)OOOO_html> or <http://www.beograd.comlkule>. 
2. The first free multiparty elections in Serbia and Montenegro were held at the same time, 
December 1990. The elections were prepared and held under circumstances so unfair for the 
opposition parties that it is not clear if they can be considered free at all. See VLADIMIR GoAT!, 
IzBORI U SRJ OD 1990 DO 1998; VOLIA GRADJANA ILl IzBORNA MANIPULACUA, 27-58 (Centar za 
slobodne izbore i demokratiju, Beograd, 1999.) [Y. GoATI, ELECTIONS IN FRY FROM 1990 TO 1998 
- WILL OF THE CITIZENS, OR ELECTORAL MANIPULATION, 27-58 (Center for Free Elections and 
Democracy, Belgrade, 1999)]. 
3. The Montenegrin Constitution was passed by the Assembly clearly dominated by deputies 
belonging to the regime, i.e. to the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists - DPS (former League of 
Communists of Montenegro). 
4. The federal constitution was adopted without a chance for the opposition to influence its 
contents, by a small number of deputies (73 out of 220, former members of the League of 
Communists, and then mostly members of Milosevic's SPS and Bulatovic's DPS) remaining in one 
of the three Chambers - the Federal Chamber - of the Assembly of the long disunited SFRY. The 
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Generally, the existing constitutional order formally provides for the 
strong status of the republics and a relatively weak federation. In Serbia, 
according to its Constitution, the President of the Republic has the most 
power; this state and political system could be called "semi-presidential." 
In Montenegro, the President of the Republic has few powers, so the 
Government and its Prime Minister are in a balanced position against 
him. The system established by the Constitution is a parliamentary one. 
Finally, on the federal level, the President of the mutual state has largely 
representative and ceremonial powers and is, under the Constitution, a 
body of minor importance. According to the FRY Constitution of 1992, 
the highest legislative body of Yugoslavia is the Federal Assembly, but 
the Government and its Prime Minister have considerable power over the 
Assembly.5 The bicameral Assembly consists of the Chamber of Citizens 
and the Chamber of Republics.6 The Chamber of Citizens is composed of 
the deputies elected directly by secret ballot; one deputy per 65,000 
voters.? 
Since the population of Montenegro makes up only about 10% of the 
total population of FRY, a corrective mechanism is built into the federal 
Constitution to abate the disproportion between the number of deputies 
coming from two entities - each member republic is to have no less 
than 30 federal deputies.8 The other chamber reflects the federal structure 
of FRY. Each republic, notwithstanding its size and the number of its 
citizens, appoints 20 deputies to the Chamber of Republics.9 Election and 
termination of the mandates of federal deputies in the Chamber of 
Citizens of the Federal Assembly are regulated by federal law, while 
first multiparty elections for the federal Parliament of the state renamed by the Constitution as the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were held some five weeks after the new Constitution was adopted, 
in May 1992. The Act on Elections, adopted immediately after the promulgation of the Constitution 
by the same Assembly, introduced an odd combination of a majoritarian and proportional electoral 
system in favor of the ruling parties. Many other features to the advantage of the regime (the design 
of electoral units; control over the media; ample financial resources; manipulations with the lists of 
the electorate; etc.) forced the most important opposition parties to boycott those elections. After 
massive civic protests in June 1992, an agreement was reached between the two sides that new, 
extraordinary, elections for the federal Parliament were to be held by the end of 1992; they occurred 
indeed in December 1992. See also V. GoAT!, supra note 2, at 59-87. 
5. For instance, according to Art. 83 of the Constitution of FRY, "The Federal Assembly 
shall be dissolved at the request of the federal government." The Constitution prescribes some 
extraordinary situations during which the government cannot dissolve the Assembly in Art. 83, sec. 
2 (if the vote of no confidence to the government was initiated in the Assembly), and in Art. 85, sec. 
I (in the first or last six months of the Assembly's term, during a state of war, imminent threat of 
war, or state of emergency). 
6. CONSTITUTION OF FRY, supra note I, art. 80, § 1. 
7. [d. art. 80, § 2. 
8. [d. 
9. [d. art. 80, § 3. 
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election and termination of the mandates of federal deputies in the 
Chamber of Republics are regulated by the law of the respective 
republic. 1O Finally, both chambers concurrently decide questions within 
the jurisdiction of the Federal Assembly, unless otherwise provided by 
the Constitution. 11 
A glance at these provisions of the federal Constitution is sufficient to 
show that this arrangement can function only while a consensus exists 
between the two member states. Namely, Serbia as a larger member has 
more directly elected deputies in the Chamber of Citizens, and has so far 
easily managed to obtain the majority required by the Constitution to 
pass a statute in this Chamber. However, an equal number of deputies in 
the Chamber of Republics, and the concurrent legislative jurisdiction of 
both Chambers in the Federal Assembly, make it possible for either 
member state to block enactment of any decision it deems contrary to its 
interests. The Constitution contains provisions with controlling 
mechanisms in such cases which, however, may secure only a temporary 
solution or lead to a parliamentary crisis and extraordinary elections for 
the federal Parliament. 12 
In practice, the real center of power is highly personalized, personified in 
Slobodan Milosevic, and shifts according to the position Milosevic 
occupies at any given moment. During Milosevic's term in office as 
President of Serbia, key powers were concentrated in the hands of the 
Serbian president, sometimes beyond constitutional limits. After Milan 
Milutinovic became President of Serbia in December 1997 replacing 
Milosevic who was nominated President of Yugoslavia by the federal 
Assembly,13 the position of the Serbian President abruptly lost its 
previous importance. On the other hand, as President of Yugoslavia 
10. Id. art. 81, § 2. Both republics have their deputies in the Chamber of Republics nominated 
and (easily) revoked by their assemblies. So far, the deputies have voted regularly in accordance 
with the interests of the republic (leadership) which nominated them. 
II. Id. art. 90. 
12. If an act has not been passed in both Chambers in an identical text, a five member 
commission is to be established to work out a harmonized text. If the commission does not come up 
with a harmonized text, or if the draft it proposed is not passed in both Chambers in the identical 
text, the version of that act adopted in one of the Chambers (which one depends on the area the 
statute regulates) may be provisionally enforced until it is enacted in both Chambers, but no longer 
than for a year after the start of its application. If by the end of that period the act is not adopted in 
both Chambers, the mandate of the Federal Assembly shall be terminated. CONSTITUTION OF FRY, 
supra note I, art. 91-93. 
13. The President of FRY is not directly elected at popular elections, but appointed and 
dismissed by the Federal Assembly. The term in office is four years, and the same individual may 
not be reelected for a second term. CONSTITUTION OF FRY, supra note 1, art. 78, § In and art. 97 
§§ 1,2. 
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Milosevic usurped powers that do not belong to that office under the 
federal Constitution, leaving no doubt as to what constitutes the key 
decision-making body on the federal level. 
All important decisions are made in parallel centers of powers and are 
transmitted to relevant institutions through mechanisms within the ruling 
parties. At the top of the hierarchy is the current President of 
Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, his wife Mirjana Markovic, and their 
circle of close collaborators. The state bodies and institutions established 
by the Constitution, including Parliament, are often used only to preserve 
the illusion of legality and legitimacy. In such a constellation, acts and 
decisions of the legislature, executive, and judiciary are directed from the 
outside, by the centers of political powers, and are sometimes openly in 
violation not only of the statutes and general acts of lower legal force but 
of the Constitution itself. 14 
14. As for the legislative bodies, particularly the federal and the Serbian, they are, generally, 
inappropriately passive during their tenns. For instance, in the period from late 1992 until the end of 
1994 the federal Assembly had worked only 18 days. See PAVLE NIKOLIC, 00 RASPAOA DO 
BEZNADJA I NADE (Filip Visnjic, Beograd, 1997) [PAVLE NIKOLIC, FROM THE BREAK UP To 
HOPELESSNESS AND HOPE, (Belgrade, 1997)]. The situation did not improve later -- although the 
Federal Assembly could work in sessions for up to 240 days during the year, in 1998 the federal 
Assembly's Chamber of Citizens held 24 sessions, while the Chamber of the Republics held only 10 
sessions. In comparison, most Western European countries' Parliaments work from 75-100 days per 
year (120 days in France). Vucina Vasovic defined this state as "the presidential anesthesia of 
parliamentarism." Regarding the Federal Assembly, he points out that "the fragile nature of the 
federation," which for a variety of reasons causes the "fleeing" or the "sliding" of powers toward the 
center of the executive, is one of the main reasons for the weak position of the federal legislative 
body. LAVIRINTI KRIZE, VUCINA VASOVIC (urednik), (Institut za Evropske Studije, Beograd, 1998) 
[VUCINA VASOVIC (ed.), THE LABYRINTHS OF CRISIS (Institute for European Studies, Belgrade, 
1998)] quoted in Milan Milosevic, Rekonstrukcija Savezne Vlade (The Reconstruction o/the Federal 
Government), VREME (weekly), no. 431, 23 January 1999. 
The extent of control of the regime over the judiciary was most obvious after the outrageous 
electoral theft by the regime of the elections for local governments in Serbia in November 1996. 
The opposition parties achieved the most significant success by then, winning majority in all the 
major cities in Serbia, but a number of results were annulled by the Electoral Board, and soon 
afterward an even larger portion was nullified by the courts. In the second round of elections the 
regime perfonned a wide range of forgeries to retain power, by extensively violating the Act on 
Elections. Although many manipulations were proven and made public, the Public Prosecutor's 
office never initiated criminal proceedings in cases of alleged violations of the Act on Elections, as it 
is mandated to do according to the law. The proceedings were initiated by an opposition party, 
against more than 50 presidents or members of electoral committees, but the judicial proceeding was 
started in only one case, which is still pending. On the other hand, in all the other elections the 
courts regularly rejected numerous appeals coming from opposition parties. The Lawyers' 
Association of Serbia instituted the Commission for Expert Analysis of the Procedures Related to 
Elections, which reviewed in detail the courts' decisions which altered the results of the elections. In 
its report the Commission established that the courts in general violated the law in those proceedings 
by: not respecting the right of all interested parties to participate in the proceedings (to the detriment 
of the coalition of opposition parties "Together"); not respecting the principle of establishing the 
truth in the pr~eedings (courts often decided solely on the grounds of unproved allegations coming 
from SPS); and violating the principle of full judicial jurisdiction in those proceedings. See The 
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B. THE POLITICAL SETTING IN YUGOSLAVIA 
The institutions of the present system are not functioning as they should, 
and are currently only a theater, while the real decision-making powers 
lie elsewhere. The multiparty system was introduced in Yugoslavia, 
Serbia, and Montenegro in 1990. The major parties in the political life of 
Yugoslavia and its member states are the following: 
The strongest ruling party in Serbia is the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). 
Its leader since 1986 has been the current President of FRY, Slobodan 
Milosevic.15 This party originated when the former League of 
Communists of Serbia (LCS) merged with the Socialist Alliance of 
Working People of Serbia (an organization which embraced the 
associations of trade unions, women, students, youth, and WWII 
veterans, actually an extension of the LCS), taking over their huge assets, 
existing organizational structure, and the majority of former members. 
SPS has been in power, both in Serbia and on the federal level, 
continuously since it originated, either alone (after the fIrst multiparty 
elections in Serbia in 1990, until the next ones in 1992), or as the 
strongest and dominant partner in various coalitions (from 1992 to 
today). Originally a left-oriented party of a communist provenance, it 
soon shifted strongly toward the right wing by incorporating numerous 
nationalist elements, merging both orientations through the years. In 
close collaboration with the extreme left and far right parties, it currently 
forms coalition government with them in the federal and Serbian 
parliaments. 
Report of the Commission ... , Documents of the Association of Lawyers of Serbia, of the Association 
of Lawyers of Montenegro, and of the Association of Lawyers of Yugoslavia; Documents of the 
Belgrade Center for Human Rights [Belgrade, 1996)). 
For more information on these and other direct elections, the means used in the electoral fraud, 
the long lasting public protests that followed, the outcomes, etc. See VESNA RAKIC-VODINELIC, ET 
AL., IzBORNA KRADJA, PRAVNI ASPEKT (Media centar, Beograd, 1997) [Y. RAKIC-VODINELIC, ET 
AL., THE ELECfORAL THEFT - LEGAL ASPECf (Media Center, Beograd, 1997]. See also LJUDSKA 
PRAVA U JUGOSLAVIJI 1998,158-165 (Beogradski centar za Ijudska prava, 1998) [HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
YUGOSLAVIA 1998, 158-165 (Belgrade Center for Human Rights, 1998)]; GoATI, supra note 3; 
Letter from Felipe Gonsales to Flavio Koti, the Chairman of OSCE at that time, (27 December 
1996); REF PC-784/96; THE FiNAL REPORT OF THE CSCE MONITORING MISSION ON THE 
PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECfIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA, December 20, 1992 
(printed in daily BORBA, 18 January 1993); REPUBLIC OF SERBIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION 
SEPTEMBER 21, 1997 AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECfION SEPTEMBER 21 AND OCfOBER 5, 1997, OSCE 
OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Report, 1997). 
15. Both the FEDERAL CONST., art. 97, sec. 2, and the SERBIAN CONST., art. 86, sec. 7 provide 
that "the President of the Republic may not engage himself in any other function or professional 
activity." When he assumed the offices of President of Serbia and later, Yugoslavia, Milosevic did 
not resign as President of the SPS, but he "froze" his function as party leader. For objectivity's sake, 
it must be said that the same thing was done by the current Montenegrin President Djukanovic, see 
infra. 
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Another party currently in power is the Yugoslav United Left (YUL) , 
headed by Milosevic's wife, Mirjana Markovic. This party was founded 
as an association of several small extreme left parties in July 1994, and, 
according to various surveys of public opinion, has never managed to 
gain the support to give it alone, more than a couple of representatives in 
the Assembly.16 Still, as a coalition partner of SPS in the federal 
parliamentary elections of 1996 and in the last Serbian parliamentary 
elections of 1997, by internal agreements within the coalition YUL has 
more representatives than its number of supporters would indicate. 17 Its 
influence in politics, the economy, and other aspects of daily life is 
disproportionately strong, extending far beyond the limits of its support. 
The Serbian Radical Party (SRS), led by Vojislav Seselj, is an openly 
extreme-right oriented party. It formed an informal coalition with SPS 
after the elections for the federal and Serbian parliaments in 1992, 
through mid-1993. At that time, SRS and SPS entered into open 
confrontation in the Serbian Assembly, resulting in the Assembly's 
dismissal by the then President of Serbia, Milosevic, and in extraordinary 
elections for the Serbian Assemblx in December 1993.18 After the last 
(again extraordinary) elections for the Serbian Assembly in 1997 SRS, 
rather unexpectedly, became the coalition partner of SPS and YUL.19 
16. The results of a survey of public opinion conducted by the Institute for Social Sciences in 
May 1996, before the last elections for the Federal Assembly (November 1996), suggested that YUL 
was supported by not more than 1.7% of the electoral body. A similar survey by the same Institute 
in May 1997, before the last elections for the Serbian Assembly held in September 1997, showed 
that only 1.1 % of the voters supported YUL. See GoAT!, supra note 3, at 94-99, 152-153. Although 
the exact number of those who actually supported YUL in these elections is not available since the 
voters voted for the coalition as a whole and not for a particular party, it is reasonable to assume that 
this figure was not considerably higher than those established by the surveys. 
17. YUL was assigned 16 representatives (1/4 of the total representatives of the coalition) in 
the Federal Assembly after the last elections, and 20 seats in the Serbian Assembly (out of 110 seats 
secured by the coalition) after the last parliamentary elections in Serbia (September 1997). In 
addition, several members of this party became ministers in the federal and the Serbian government. 
18. SRS initiated the proceedings in the Assembly for a vote of no confidence on the 
government of Serbia. The opposition parties, which at the beginning decided not to take sides and 
to abstain from voting in this matter, later backed the initiative, and the dismissal of the government 
seemed inevitable. See GoAT!, supra note 3. Thus, Milosevic dismissed the Parliament on the 
grounds of the SERBIAN CONST., art. 98, sec. 1 (which grants him the power to do so "at the proposal 
of the Government containing justified grounds"). 
19. After these elections for Serbian National Assembly, the SPS did not manage to win the 
majority, even in coalition with YUL and its previous coalition partner, another small party called 
New Democracy (together, they won 34.2% of all votes, and 44.0% of the seats in the Assembly). 
SPS had to enter into coalition with another party to secure the majority in the Assembly. It seemed 
that this time it would be forced to reach an agreement with the largest and most influential 
opposition party at that time, Serbian Renewal Movement, to form a relatively stable federal 
government. However, the negotiations between SPS and SRM failed, apparently because SPS was 
not ready to renounce as much power as SRM thought it was in a position to demand· in that 
8
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The differences in programs among these three partners, particularly 
between SRS and the other two parties, are huge in many respects, 
making their current coalition appear awkward and seemingly difficult to 
sustain. Nevertheless, the "red-black coalition," as it is nicknamed, has 
been functioning well so far. 
Some parties were founded by the regime in order to confuse the 
electorate and cause dissipation of votes that would otherwise go to the 
opposition. Such parties usually reappear in public some time before the 
elections or when the regime needs support for its intended moves, but 
have no real influence in the political life. 
The Serbian Renewal Movement (SRM) is the opposition party with the 
strongest support among voters. Its orientation has changed over the 
years from the extreme right toward the center, and it is now best 
described as a right party of the center, democratically and nationally 
oriented, with elements of monarchism. SRM has entered into loose 
coalitions with other democratically oriented opposition parties prior to 
elections, but its tendency to take a leading role within the opposition, 
among other reasons, has contributed to conflicts with other parties, and 
to the short life of such alliances. 
Mter ''Together,,,2o the last alliance SRM joined, fell apart in mid-1997, 
SRM decided to participate alone in the elections for the Serbian 
parliament in September 1997, which its former coalition partners 
boycotted. Since the SPS dominated coalition achieved poor success in 
the Serbian parliamentary elections, SRM seemed to be the most likely 
candidate to form the coalition government with it, but that did not occur 
(See note 20, infra). 
To all appearances, soon after the split of the "Together" alliance the 
leadership of SRM, until then in bitter opposition to SPS, shifted towards 
the regime in some respects, and even started openly collaborating with it 
situation. Just after abandoning talks with SRM, SPS announced its coalition with SRS. The 
outcome was further radicalization of the already tensed political situation in many respects (further 
gradual aggravation of the situation in Kosovo and of relations with the international community, 
worse persecution of the independent media, a new and unprecedented attack on the University and 
its autonomy, and the sharpening of the already exceptionally totalitarian practices of the regime). 
20. Besides SRM, the opposition alliance "Together" was joined by the Democratic Party 
(DP), Democratic Party of Serbia (DPOS), and the Civic Alliance of Serbia (CAS), all of which 
were represented in Parliament at that time, and by other smaller democratically oriented political 
parties. 
9
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on some issues.21 Since then, until recently, SRM has avoided open 
conflicts with SPS, and in some local governments where it won the 
majority even adopted elements of the regime's style of governing. This 
caused huge dissatisfaction among its members, resulting in a decrease 
of support to SRM. 
In January 1999, the leader of SRM, Vuk Draskovic, was appointed 
Deputy Prime Minister of the federal Government, while some SRM 
members entered the federal government. However, Draskovic was 
dismissed from office at the end of April 1999 at the peak of NATO's 
bombing of Yugoslavia, after criticizing aspects of the government's 
policy in that period. SRM did not join the anti-regime protests allover 
Serbia that occurred for about two and a half months (from September 21 
until early December 1999), the majority of which were organized by the 
Alliance for Change (an umbrella organization which includes various 
political parties, individuals, and associations). 
On October 3, 1999, a loaded truck suddenly veered into two cars 
carrying Draskovic and several other members of SRM, killing four 
passengers. Draskovic was slightly injured in the accident. The driver of 
the truck fled, and was not found or even identified. The circumstances 
of the accident, and the inefficient investigation encouraged speculation 
that the accident was "an obvious assassination attempt" by the regime. 22 
Since then, SRM is reluctantly but gradually getting closer to joining the 
efforts with other opposition parties. 
The Democratic Party (DP), led by Zoran Djindjic, is a democratically 
oriented party that has participated in the political life of Serbia and 
Yugoslavia with varying degrees of success. Depending on 
circumstances, it sometimes participated alone in elections, sometimes 
joined in alliances with other opposition parties, and sometimes 
21. The collaboration became manifest when the representatives of SPS, and some of the SRS 
as well, supported SRM and its leader in the Assembly of Belgrade in its showdown with Zoran 
Djindjic, the leader of DP and later the Mayor of Belgrade (President of the Belgrade Assembly) at 
that time, forcing him out of office. SRM's member replaced Djindjic and became the "acting 
Mayor of Belgrade." 
22. Draskovic on TV Studio B, 3 October 1999 - Source: FREEB92 DAILY NEWS (4 October 
1999), Internet issue, in English at <hup:llwww.freeb92.netJarchive/e/>. For more details see Nenad 
Lj. Stefanovic and Zoran B. Nikolic, Nesreca na lbarskoj magistrali - Atentat? [The Accident on the 
lbar Highway - An Assassination?], VREME, no. 457, October 9, 1999. 
According to the SRM's speakers, an independent investigation conducted by the SRM revealed 
certain facts that connect the State Security's office to this accident. In December 1999 SRM 
officially addressed the State Prosecutor's office, requiring an investigation against the heads of the 
Serbian and Belgrade State Security, but the request was dismissed. See FREEB92 DAILY NEWS (6 
December 1999) at <http://www.freeb92.net/archives>. 
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boycotted elections. Since its last boycott of the parliamentary elections 
in Serbia in 1997, it has acted outside the Serbian Parliament. When 
SRM became more aligned with the regime, DP became the strongest 
party in opposition. 
The Civic Alliance of Serbia (CAS) is a small opposition party, probably 
the most consistently democratic and anti-regime in FRY. It has formed 
coalitions with other opposition parties. Its electorate is small, sufficient 
to secure only a few seats in the Assembly. Thus, it has had a rather 
limited influence in the political life of Serbia and Yugoslavia. 
The Democratic Party of Serbia (DPOS) is one of the factions that 
separated from DP in the early 1990's. It is supported by a rather stable, 
though small, electorate. Although sometimes giving supremacy to 
national issues over democratic ones, DPOS has criticized the regime 
constantly since its inception. Another faction from DP is the 
Democratic Center (DC), the leader of which was an initiator and 
organizer of the round table of opposition parties. 
Numerous smaller parties are active in Serbia. Some are organized on 
the ethnic principle - for instance the Democratic Alliance of 
Hungarians of Vojvodina (DAHV), or the Party of Democratic Action 
(PDA) which represents the Muslims of Yugoslavia. Their influence is 
largely restricted to the major part of the ethnic group they represent, and 
to a region inhabited by the members of the specific ethnic group. 
Factions appear even within these parties. 
Other smaller parties have regional or local importance, like the League 
of Social-Democrats of Vojvodina (LSDV), or the coalition 
"Vojvodina," consisting of several small parties from the northern 
province of Serbia. New Democracy (ND) is a small party that has been 
a coalition partner of SPS since the end of 1993, but is now its stem 
critic. Some parties are led by former members of SPS, or former high 
ranking military officers once close to the regime, like Democratic 
Alternative (DA), Social-Democracy (SD), and Movement for a 
Democratic Serbia (MDS). They have mostly attempted to attract 
disappointed members and supporters of SPS. 
The Serbian opposition parties acted separately most of the time, 
producing a fragmented electorate and a dissipation of votes in the ruling 
parties' best interests. Their gradual assembly into larger coalitions 
began in mid-1999. A round table of opposition parties was initiated 
during the 1999 protests, with the aim of gathering forces against 
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Milosevic and the regime. In January 2000, all relevant parties reached a 
consensus on coordinated action for several major issues. 
In Montenegro, the strongest political party is the Democratic Party of 
Socialists (DPS)23. Since 1997 its leader has been Milo Djukanovic 
(formerly its vice-president), currently the President of Montenegro. It is 
the ruling party in Montenegro, and was the essential coalition partner of 
SPS on the federal level. In all elections since the multiparty system was 
introduced in 199024 except for those in 1998, DPS won enough votes to 
stay in power without entering into any coalition. During the most recent 
elections for Montenegro's Assembly in 1998 it was a dominant partner 
in the winning coalition named "To Live Better." Divisions within the 
party, concentrating primarily on the status of Montenegro in the 
federation, surfaced in mid-1997, causing its rupture into two factions, 
and gradually generating the severe crisis of the federal state (described 
in more detail in the next section). 
The Socialist People's Party (SPP) is led by the former president of DPS, 
Momir Bulatovic, current Prime Minister of FRY's government. SPP 
appeared in 1997 as a faction of DPS during the power struggle between 
former close associates Djukanovic and Bulatovic.25 Although the 
coalition "To Live Better" prevailed in the last republican parliamentary 
elections, SPP won more than one-third of the seats in the Montenegrin 
Assembly, proving it is still an important political factor in Montenegro, 
and to some extent on the federal level. 
Aside from these two parties with common roots, several opposition 
parties are active in Montenegro. The People's Party (PP) and the 
Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (LAM) are the two most important. So 
far, opposition parties in Montenegro have not come close to replacing 
the ruling party, either alone or in coalitions. In the 1998 elections for 
the Montenegrin Assembly, PP and other opposition parties entered the 
coalition "To Live Better" with Djukanovic's DPS. 
23. In the Montenegrin parliamentary elections of 1990, DPS participated under its previous 
name - League of Communists of Montenegro (LCM). The name of the party was changed from 
LCM to DPS in June 1991. 
24. Elections for the Federal Assembly held in May 1992, December 1992, and 1996, and the 
elections for the Assembly of Montenegro held in 1990, 1992 and 1996. 
25. After the division of DPS, both factions strove to keep the DPS's name. For more than six 
months, even during the critical presidential elections in Montenegro in October 1997, both factions 
performed under the name of DPS, with the name of each faction's president after that. Only in 
March 1998 did Bulatovic's faction change its name to SPP. 
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Ethnic Albanians populated in the southern Serbian province of Kosovo 
have never recognized FRY or the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy, and 
have pressed for an independent state. ,Political parties of Kosovar 
Albanians, joined in the boycott by the large majority of the Albanian 
population, have not participated in elections held in Yugoslavia or 
Serbia since 1990 (except in those illegally held by ethnic Albanians' 
parties in Kosovo, for their para-state bodies), nor have they engaged in 
the political life of the rest of Serbia in any other way. 
Thus, a large part of the electorate remained outside the political systems 
of Serbia and Yugoslavia during the 1990'S.26 Montenegro is the 
exception, since the political parties of its Albanian population never 
called for a boycott of elections, and regularly participated in republican 
parliamentary and presidential elections. Since 1996, the Democratic 
Union of Albanians not only participated in Montenegrin parliamentary 
elections, but won seats in the parliament as well. 
III. THE CRISIS OF YUGOSLAV FEDERALISM 
A. DIVISIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL UNITS OF SERBIA AND 
MONTENEGRO 
Leadership of the republics of Serbia and Montenegro has long been 
homogeneous. The ruling parties - SPS (Serbia) and DPS 
(Montenegro) - have been in close cooperation. Potential disputes were 
regularly settled informally, outside of parliament or government, and no 
severe controversies existed on the federal level. However, in rnid-1997 
a crack appeared in the leadership of Montenegro and the DPS, resulting 
in the appearance of two factions - a majoritarian faction which 
supported Milo Djukanovic, then Prime Minister of Montenegro and 
vice-president of DPS, and another faction led by Momir Bulatovic, then 
President of Montenegro of DPS. The former was also supported by the 
most Montenegrin and Serbian opposition parties, while the latter 
enjoyed the open support of the Serbian and federal leadership, headed 
26. The regime actually benefited from the massive abstention of Kosovar Albanians from 
participating in the elections in Serbia and Yugoslavia. Because the boycott was joined by a large 
part of the population in Kosovo, the SPS candidates had no real opposition there. Thus, they 
regularly won in all, or in the large majority of electoral units in Kosovo (about 15-20% of the total 
number of seats in the Assembly, depending on the elections), where the total number of voters who 
participated in all electoral units in Kosovo sometimes equaled the number of voters in only one 
larger electoral unit in another part of Serbia. In few extreme cases, only several dozen votes were 
sufficient for an SPS candidate to win the elections in particular electoral units in Kosovo. 
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by Milosevic, who was appointed President of Yugoslavia by the Federal 
Assembly in mid-1997. 
The conflict escalated some time before the presidential elections in 
Montenegro in October 1997 when these two high ranking Montenegrin 
officials and former close associates proposed two antithetical programs 
- a reformist one by Djukanovic, and one aimed at keepip.g the state as 
it was by Bulatovic. Djukanovic started advocating the need for 
democratization and overwhelming reform in FRY, and criticized the 
policies of the leadership of Serbia and of the federal government by 
blaming them openly for attempts to centralize the federal state and use 
its organs to ensure the supremacy of Serbia over Montenegro. He 
pointed to Milosevic as the most important factor of instability and the 
generator of crises in Yugoslavia, as well as to then Montenegrin 
President Bulatovic for neglecting the interests of Montenegro in the 
federal state. 
This generated a split inside DPS. The majoritarian reformist wing in the 
Montenegrin DPS, backing Djukanovic, decided to nominate him as a 
presidential candidate, and he filed his application with the Montenegrin 
Electoral Commission, which accepted it. Since the Montenegrin statute 
governing presidential elections prescribes that each political party in the 
Republic may nominate only one presidential candidate (both republics 
had adopted this solution), Bulatovic could no longer be nominated for 
President by that party. However, his pro-Milosevic oriented supporters 
within DPS held a party conference a couple of days later, where he was 
nominated as a presidential candidate by the other faction of the same 
party. 
At first, the Electoral Commission accepted Bulatovic's nomination as 
well, but Djukanovic's wing within DPS filed a complaint to the 
Montenegrin Constitutional Court, which has jurisdiction in these 
matters.27 The Court accepted the complaint, arguing that the 
nomination of more than one candidate by the same party was against 
electoral law. Since Djukanovic's nomination by DPS came first, 
Bulatovic's candidacy could not have been accepted, and was 
accordingly invalidated by the Electoral Commission. He then exhausted 
available legal remedies within Montenegro, but the challenged decision 
of the Electoral Committee was upheld. 
27. CONST. OF THE REpUBLIC OF MONTENEGRO, art. 113, § 118 (trans!. by author) [hereinafter 
CONST.OFMoNTENEGROj. 
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The federal bodies joined the showdown on B ulatovic' s side. He filed an 
appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court, the members of which are 
appointed by the Federal Assembly,28 and the majority of which is 
controlled by the Serbian regime. According to the federal Constitution; 
republics are sovereign in matters not reserved to the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the federal Constitution, and they 
autonomously organize their governments by their own Constitutions.29 
Accordingly, the Federal Constitutional Court has jurisdiction only in 
cases in which the alleged violation of rights occurred in the course of 
elections of federal officials,30 while the Montenegrin Constitutional 
Court has exclusive jurisdiction to "decide in electoral disputes. . . 
which are not in jurisdiction of the trial courts. ,,31 Basing their argument 
on these constitutional provisions, all relevant Montenegrin state 
authorities held that the Federal Constitutional Court had no jurisdiction 
whatsoever in this matter and should dismiss the complaint without 
reviewing the decision. 
The Federal Constitutional Court nonetheless reviewed the complaint. It 
found an indirect way to effectively invalidate the Montenegrin 
Constitutional Court's decision and the decision of the Montenegrin 
Electoral Commission. In his complaint, Bulatovic argued that the 
article of the Montenegrin Act on Elections which provided' for the 
nomination of only one candidate by each party was in violation of his 
right, guaranteed by the federal Constitution, to participate in political 
life.32 Since that right is prescribed in the federal Constitution (as well as 
in the two others), the Federal Constitutional Court fIrst held it had 
jurisdiction in this matter; it then found that provision of the Act violated 
Bulatovic's right to participate in presidential elections, and fInally 
annulled the decision of the Electoral Commission which rejected 
Bulatovic's candidacy. Although this decision was openly discarded by 
Montenegrin authorities, the Electoral Commission reversed its decision 
by allowing Bulatovic to participate in the presidential elections as a 
candidate of the DPS faction loyal to him. 
28. CONST, OF FRY, art, 78, § In. 
29. ld. art. 6, §§ 2, 3. See also CONST. OF MONTEl'{EGRO, art. 2, §§ 1-3. 
30. CONST. OF FRY, art. 124, § 119. 
31. CONST. OF MONTENEGRO, art. 113, § 1/8. 
32. CONST. OF FRY, Art. 34. 
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Djukanovic won the presidential election in the second round with a very 
narrow margin (50.8% to 49.2% of votes).33 The reaction from the 
federal level came immediately. In an attempt to render the results of the 
elections invalid, Bulatovic submitted to the federal state prosecutor a 
motion for an extraordinary legal remedy (Request for the Protection of 
Legality) before the federal court, against the Montenegrin Supreme 
Court's decisions on voter registration?4 Bulatovic submitted several 
thousand such requests. 
Although Montenegrin authorities argued that federal institutions have 
no authority in electoral disputes within member-states, the Federal 
Court annulled some 2300 decisions, issuing an order that all 
registrations accepted between the two rounds of elections were illegal, 
and that those voters must be deleted from electoral lists. The intent was 
to aid Bulatovic in obtaining legal grounds to require nullification of the 
results and to demand new elections. Montenegrin authorities explicitly 
declined to conform with the nullifying orders of the Federal Court, and 
in December 1997 the Montenegrin Parliament enacted a resolution 
condemning the "breach of the legal system of Yugoslavia." Some 
Montenegrin officials mentioned the possibility of a referendum on 
whether Montenegro should remain in the federation with Serbia. 
As January 15, 1998, the day the new President was to take office 
approached, the situation in Montenegro was getting more strained by 
the day.35 Bulatovic eventually left the office to Djukanovic, while 
Milosevic suddenly found himself in a serious confrontation with the 
best part of the Montenegrin state leadership. He needed strong backup 
on the federal level, where the center of power moved with him. His 
33. After the first round of elections Bulatovic received more votes than Djukanovic (the other 
candidates lagged far behind them), but not more than 50% of those who voted (a requirement for 
victory in the first round). The two of them continued the contest in the second round. Between two 
rounds of election, the Supreme Court of Montenegro (backing Djukanovic) accepted nearly 14,000 
requests for registration of voters, which were added to electoral lists in the second round. Bulatovic 
filed a complaint in the Montenegrin Constitutional Court claiming electoral fraud on two grounds 
(one of which was the allegedly illegal registration of additional voters between the two rounds), but 
his attempt was unsuccessful. 
34. The Supreme Court is the highest court of the Republic. See CONST. OF MONTENEGRO, 
art. 104. 
35. Bulatovic did not recognize the results of the elections, and stated he would not hand over 
the office since the electoral fraud was judicially confirmed. Bulatovic's wing of DPS, abetted by 
the Serbian authorities, organized public protests in support of Bulatovic, reportedly to provoke riots 
and .give federal authorities an excuse to proclaim a state of emergency on the territory of 
Montenegro, with all the consequences that would follow. The protests culminated on the day of 
inauguration, but their escalation to bigger disorders was prevented by the police. 
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next step was to replace the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, Radoje 
Kontic, with a more reliable ally, Bulatovic. 
In an attempt to prevent this move, the Montenegrin Assembly quickly 
amended its act regulating the election of deputies to the Chamber of 
Republics in the Federal Assembly,36 and replaced six Montenegrin 
deputies in that Chamber still loyal to Bulatovic. However, new 
nominations were rejected and the previous deputies' mandates were 
restored by the Federal Assembly's Mandate Commission, with the 
rationale that the Federal Constitutional Court must decide on the legality 
of the Montenegrin Assembly's dismissal of deputies before the 
removals would be effective. Kontic received a vote of no confidence in 
the Federal Assembly in May 1998, and Bulatovic became Prime 
Minister of the Yugoslav government in his place.37 
The next day the Montenegrin Parliament passed a resolution stating it 
did not recognize the legitimacy of the new federal government. Since 
then, the federal arrangement established by the FRY Constitution has 
been practically non-functional in many respects. Montenegro has not 
recognized decisions made by federal bodies since mid-1998, and has 
refused to pay any of its share of the federal budget. 38 
In October 1998, under the shadow of NATO's threats of armed 
intervention against Yugoslavia, the Montenegrin Constitutional Court 
ruled that decisions of the extraordinary session of the Federal Assembly, 
which convened on October 5, would not be recognized in Montenegro.39 
From a legal standpoint, this decision was invalid because the authority 
to decide on the constitutionality of a federal legal act is vested in the 
Federal Constitutional Court, whereas the Montenegrin Constitutional 
36. The amendment explicitly allows the Montenegrin Parliament to revoke the mandates in 
the Federal Assembly's Chamber of Republics of those deputies who fail to "represent Montenegro's 
interests as defined under the Constitution and laws, and with other regulations adopted by the 
republican Parliament." 
37. See also V. GoAT!, supra note 2. 
38. To secure incomes from customs, which the Montenegrin government is not transferring to 
the federal budget, in early March 1999 the Federal Customs Bureau sent 76 customs officers from 
posts in Serbia to Montenegro, while 68 Montenegrin customs officers were to be moved to various 
posts in Serbia. The decision was not accepted by the Montenegrin government and the officers 
from Serbia were returned, while 65 of 68 Montenegrin officers refused to report to the newly 
assigned duties. See Velizar Brajovic, Jugoslavija - Crna Gora: Carinski rat ,VREME, no. 437, 
March 6,1999. 
39. See Constitution Watch - Update on Yugoslavia, 7 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 74 noA (Fall 
1998). The EEC Review Internet issue can be found at <http://www.law.nyu.eduJeecr/>. 
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Court has no such power.40 Nonetheless, it was a strong political 
declaration reflecting deteriorating relations among the federal units. 
This situation, a constant source of potential conflict that could expand to 
unpredictable and uncontrollable levels, persisted until NATO's 
aggression in March 1999. When the bombardments began·, Montenegro 
declared neutrality and distanced itself from the Serbian regime. Despite 
several days of bombing, it was spared larger destruction. Relations 
between the federal 'army and the Montenegrin authorities were 
extremely tense over this time. During the state of war in Yugoslavia the 
indications were that federal (and Serbian) authorities might try to 
remove the Montenegrin government, which could have provoked a civil 
war. That did not happen, but the relationship between the two partners 
in the federation did not improve. At the end of May 1999, the 
Montenegrin government prepared a document called "The Basis of the 
Project for Rearrangement of Relations Between Montenegro and 
Serbia." Shortly after the NATO bombardments ended in early June, 
Montenegrin authorities became more resolute in requesting redefinition 
of the federal arrangement of Yugoslavia, or Montenegro might have 
continued its existence as an independent state. The Serbian 
establishment ignored the initiative until Djukanovic revealed that 
Montenegro had set a deadline for Serbia's reply. In response, Serbian 
authorities offered negotiations on the party level.41 Talks between DPS 
and each of the Serbian ruling parties on the platform presented by DPS 
were conducted during autumn 1999, but with no tangible results.42 
The latest developments have further alienated the two federal units. As 
an interim measure, on November 2, 1999 Montenegro introduced 
German mark as a parallel currency to the YU dinar (the official 
Yugoslav currency) within the Republic, and established its own 
Monetary Council.43 The intention was to replace this dual monetary 
system with the Montenegro's own currency and establish its own 
monetary institutions.44 The Federal Constitutional Court, acting upon 
the request of the federal National Bank, issued a temporary injunction 
banning those actions of Montenegrin government,45 and later issued a 
40. CaNST. OF FRY, art. 124; CaNST. OF MONTENEGRO, art. 113. 
41. FREEB92 DAILY NEWS (OS, 07, and 08 October 1999), Internet issue, in English at 
<http://www.freeb92.net/archive/e/>. 
42. In mid December 1999, DPS announced that there is no sense in continuing the talks about 
the proposed project on the party level, but that the official answer from the Serbian authorities is 
still expected. [d. 11 December 1999. 
43. [d. 2 November 1999. 
44. [d. 14, 15 January 2000. 
45. /d. 24 November 1999. 
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decision on their unconstitutionality,46 but its decisions were ignored in 
Montenegro. A customs war is now taking place between the two 
federal units.47 Friction between the federal army and Montenegrin 
authorities occurs from time to time, threatening to spark yet another 
armed conflict.48 Montenegrin authorities are effectively acting 
independently of the federal state, and generally do not recognize federal 
bodies nor comply with their acts and decisions. On the other hand, 
Serbian and federal authorities steadily display hostility rather than good 
will in attempting to compromise. Voices requiring a referendum on 
whether Montenegro should stay in the federation or proclaim 
independence are becoming louder, and this alternative might soon 
prevail on the political agenda over claims for redefinition of the federal 
arrangement.49 It is unlikely that a unilateral proclamation of 
Montenegro's independence would end peacefully. The present situation 
resembles the one that existed less then a decade ago, before the former 
SFRY split. 
B. REVOCATION OF THE AUTONOMY OF THE PROVINCES OF 
VONODINA AND Kosovo 
A new provision of the constitutional system of the 1990's affected the 
status of the "autonomous provinces": although that term remained,5o 
their autonomy has been abolished. The federal Constitution does not 
mention "autonomous provinces" at all, while Chapter VI of the 
Constitution of Serbia (Territorial Organization), includes provisions 
concerning "autonomous provinces" which regulate their status, organs, 
and authorities.51 
Consequently, all powers related to these features of the provinces are 
vested solely in the Republic of Serbia, while the federal state has no 
authority in these matters. The highest legal act of an autonomous 
province is its statute.52 Previously, each province had the authority to 
46. Id. 26 January 2000. 
47. Id. 24,27 September 1999. 
48. Id. 9, 14, and 23 December 1999. 
49. Probably the most weighty demand of the kind so far came recently from the Montenegrin 
Social Democrat Party, which belongs to the current ruling coalition in Montenegro: it required its 
coalition partners to announce a referendum on Montenegro's future status by the end of March 
2000, since that is "one of the conditions for the survival of the coalition". See /d. 20 January 2000. 
50. The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia of 1990 changed the name of the southern 
province from "Kosovo" (introduced by the Constitutions of SFRY and Serbia of 1974), to "Kosovo 
and Metohija" (as it was called before the 1974 SFRY Constitution was enacted). 
51. CONSTfI1JTION OF THE REpUBLIC OF SERBIA, art. 108-112. The English translation of the 
text of the Serbian Constitution can be found on Internet at <http://www.beograd.comlkule/>. 
52. /d. art. llO, § 1. 
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enact its own constitution within the powers vested by the federal and 
republic's constitutions. The statute is subject to the prior approval of 
the National Assembly of Serbia.53 The territory of an autonomous 
province is established by a statute of the Republic of Serbia.54 
Formally, the provinces have their own assemblies, executive councils, 
and agencies of administration,55 but the powers of these bodies are 
restricted. The Assembly of a province, its highest body, consisting of 
directly elected representatives, has no legislative authority; it can only 
enact "decisions and general enactments" in the 'areas enumerated by the 
Constitution of Serbia. 56 A look at the provision which enumerates the 
powers granted to the provinces57 reveals that "autonomy," as 
determined in the Serbian Constitution, is very limited, and has little to 
do with the concept of autonomy, but instead contains powers usually 
delegated to local authorities. 
C. CENTRALIZATION OF POWERS IN SERBIA 
Revocation of the autonomy of the provinces was accompanied by 
excessive centralization of powers in the Republic of Serbia. This 
generated huge dissatisfaction in both provinces. As mentioned earlier, 
53. [d. art. 110, § 2. 
54. [d. art. 108, § 3. 
55. [d. art. 111, § 1. 
56. [d. art. 109, § 113. 
57. These powers are enumerated in Article 109 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia: 
"The autonomous province shall, through its own agencies: 
I) enact the program of economic, scientific, technological, demographic, regional and 
social development, development of agriculture and rural areas, in accordance with the 
development plan of the Republic of Serbia, and shall lay down measures' for their 
implementation; 
2) adopt a budget and annual balance sheet; 
3) enact decisions and general enactments in accordance with the Constitution and law, to 
regulate matters affecting the citizens in the' autonomous province in the areas of: culture; 
education; official use of the language and alphabet of the national minority; public 
information, health and social welfare; child welfare, protection and advancement of 
environment; urban and country planning; and in other areas established by law; 
4) enforce laws, other regulations and general enactments of the Republic of Serbia, 
whose enforcement has been entrusted to the agencies of the autonomous province, and pass 
regulations necessary for their enforcement if so proved by the law; see to the execution of 
provincial decisions and general enactments; 
5) establish agencies, organizations and services of the autonomous province, and 
regulate their organization and work; 
6) attend to other business laid down under the Constitution and law, as well as by the 
statute of the autonomous province. 
The Republic of Serbia may entrust by a law an autonomous province with the 
performance of specific affairs within its own competencies and transfer to it the necessary 
funds for this purpose. The autonomous province shall collect revenues as laid down by 
law." 
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Albanian political factors in Kosovo never recognized the Serbian and 
Yugoslav constitutional order and were almost unanimous in requiring 
independence for Kosovo. All of this was taking place in a context in 
which inter-ethnic relations had become greatly disturbed. 
Separatist tendencies, present among the Albanian population in Kosovo 
since the early 1980' s, gradually became more radical. Serbian 
authorities tried to suppress them by repressive means which led fIrst to 
the Albanian minority's boycott of the institutions of Serbia and 
Yugoslavia and the formation of a kind of a parallel state of Albanians in 
Kosovo in the 1990's, and then to the appearance of armed guerrilla 
forces known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the proclaimed 
objective of which was the armed fIght for an independent Kosovo. 
The fIrst guerrilla actions of the KLA are deemed to have started in the 
spring of 1998, about a year after its reported formation. The Serbian 
authorities never really tried to negotiate and reach a solution acceptable 
to both parties, but instead increased the repression against Albanians in 
Kosovo, which gradually led to an open armed conflict between the KLA 
and Serbian police, later joined by the army.58 
The protests from abroad directed toward the Serbian regime, followed 
by political and economic pressure from many countries and regional and 
international organizations, were ignored by Serbian and federal 
authorities, which adhered to the view that the crisis in Kosovo was an 
internal affair of Serbia and Yugoslavia. In October 1998 members of 
NATO threatened to resort to the bombing of Yugoslavia if the conflict 
in Kosovo continued. A day after the deadline, an agreement was 
58. The fact that, besides police forces, the Yugoslav Army was also engaged in Kosovo 
against the KLA was officially (and only indirectly) recognized on October 5, 1998. At that time the 
NATO alliance threatened to use force against Yugoslavia because of the situation in Kosovo. The 
Federal Assembly convened in the extraordinary session, and the federal Prime Minister, Bulatovic, 
in his address to the representatives, said that Yugoslavia was under an immediate threat of war 
(later at the same session he clarified that his statement was not to be taken as a formal proposal to 
the Assembly to proclaim a state of imminent threat of war, which it could do under Art. 78, sec. 113 
of the federal Constitution), and said that the Yugoslav Army was withdrawing from Kosovo 
(emphasis added.). By then, the official version was that the crisis in Kosovo was an "internal 
matter of Serbia," and that only Serbian police, but not the Yugoslav army, was engaged in fighting. 
See Constitution Watch - Update on Yugoslavia, 7 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 73-74 no.4 (Fall 1998), 
Internet issue at <http://www.law.nyu.eduJeecr/>. 
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reached and the bombing did not begin at that time,59 but the violence in 
Kosovo escalated further. 
The last attempt to reach a peaceful end to the cnsts was made in 
February 1999, when negotiations between representatives of Kosovar 
Albanians and Serbian authorities were organized in Rambouillet, 
France. A document prepared for signing was again backed by an 
ultimatum of NATO that it would bomb Yugoslavia if there was no 
agreement. Since neither party signed the document in France, the 
deadline was postponed until mid-March. After additional pressure on 
both parties, representatives of Kosovar Albanians eventually signed, but 
the Serbian regime rejected the document, claiming it did not guarantee 
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Serbia and Yugoslavia. 
The final outcome was that on March 24, 1999 NATO started an 
extensive bombing campaign against Yugoslavia which continued for 
over two and half months. The bombings ended soon after an agreement 
between the Yugoslav Army and NATO was signed. Following the 
agreement, all federal army troops and Serbian police forces, as well as 
Serbian paramilitary forces that also took part in the clashes, withdrew 
from Kosovo by June 20, and international troops (KFOR - Kosovo 
Forces) under the auspices of the United Nations were deployed in the 
province.6o 
Using the aggression as an excuse, the regime intensified armed 
operations against ethnic Albanians, forcing their massive expUlsion 
from many areas of KoSOVO.61 On May 27, while the bombing was going 
on, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the 
Hague officially announced its decision to indict President Milosevic and 
four other high-ranking officials (the President and the Minister of the 
Interior of Serbia, one of the federal Deputy Prime Ministers, and the 
chief of the federal Army) for crimes against humanity and war crimes 
committed in Kosovo in 1999. 
59. On 13 October 1998, the U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke reached an agreement with 
Milosevic. The agreement was signed on 16 October, by OSCE Chainnan Bronislaw Geremek and 
Yugoslav Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic. 
60. See Resolution 1244 of the United Nations' Security Council (establishing the basic 
political and legal framework for administering Kosovo in an unspecified transitional period). 
61. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that around 750.000 
Albanians were forced to flee, or were expelled from the country from about March 1998, when the 
armed clashes in Kosovo intensified, until the end of the NATO bombing campaign in June 1999. 
See Constitution Watch - Update on Yugoslavia, 8 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 37 no.3 (Summer 1999). 
Internet issue at <http://www.law.nyu.eduleecr/>. 
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NATO's aggression resulted in massive destruction all over Yugoslavia 
- its infrastructure (bridges, roads, heating and electricity plants, 
networks for distribution of drinking water, homes) was devastated, 
numerous industrial plants of all kinds (such as factories and oil 
refineries) were obliterated or heavily damaged. Approximately 500,000 
people have no jobs to return to, raising the already high unemployment 
rate to 40%.62 Since the KFOR troops were deployed in Kosovo, a large 
part of the Kosovar Serbian population has fled the province,63 either in 
fear of retaliation from the Albanians, or because KFOR did not manage 
to prevent the occurrences of reprisals.64 The final number of victims has 
not yet been officially established for either side.65 
After the NATO intervention, Vojvodina it remains the only federal unit 
of the former SFRY whose status has not been modified in some way. 
While the majority of Serbian political actors did not support significant 
changes in its current position, most local political parties constantly 
objected to its status. Requests for redefinition of its relations with 
Serbia were recently articulated and coordinated. In addition to the 
catastrophic consequences of the policy conducted in Serbia and 
Yugoslavia since the late 1980's, such demands stress the distinct 
multi ethnic structure of Vojvodina's population, as well as various 
historical, economical, legal, political, and other factors. Although 
voices calling for an independent Vojvodina sound more frequently, the 
relevant local political parties do not advance that option. They agree on 
the need for some kind of autonomy for the northern province, while 
62. The assessments of damage done by the bombing vary from $30 billion to $100 billion 
(these assessments do not include the damage done in Kosovo). See id at 38. A list of destroyed or 
damaged objects can be found on Internet at <http://www.beograd.com>. 
63. The most conservative assessments dating from mid-summer 1999 place this number 
around 100.000. See id. at 37 n. 58. 
64. For a daily update on the current situation in Kosovo see, for instance, FREEB92 DAILY 
NEWS, Internet issue in English at <http://www.freeb92.netlarchivelel>. See also Constitution 
Watch - Update on Yugoslavia, in the issues of the E. EUR. CONST. REV., supra note 39. 
65. The total number of victims among Kosovar Albanians is still being established. The 
estimations in western sources during the NATO campaign mostly revolved around the figure of 
about 100.000 killed Albanians. Multinational experts groups for investigating war crimes in 
Kosovo, after five months of investigation, issued a report with the figure of 2108 established 
victims so far. The investigation is to be continued from 31 March 2000, and current assessments of 
the number of victims among Kosovar Albanians range from 4600 (UNHCR, in loNDON TiMES) to 
about 8.000 Kosovar Albanians (see: ROKSANDA NINCIC, In Search/or Justice (Crimes in Kosovo), 
Vreme no. 463, 9-13, 20 November 1999). As for the victims among the rest of the population of 
Yugoslavia, the number officially declared by Yugoslav authorities is much lower than the figure 
assessed by foreign sources, although both come close on the number of victims among civilians 
"collateral damage" (the former claim that fewer then 600 hundred soldiers and policemen, and 
around 1500 civilians were killed, while the latter estimate the total number at around 5000 soldiers 
and policemen, and around 1500 civilians killed). See Constitution Watch - Update on Yugoslavia, 
8 E. EUR. CONST. REv. 37 no.3 (Summer 1999). 
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differences exist as to what level of autonomy Vojvodina should enjoy, 
and which form of autonomy should be applied (varying from models of 
Vojvodina as a republic within a redefined federation, to models of 
autonomy similar to the one enjoyed previously).66 
IV. THE STATUS OF THE MEDIA - FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION AND OF THE PRESS 
A. REPRESSION OF THE MEDIA (1990-1998) 
The media has played an important role in the political events in 
Yugoslavia during the 1990's. From the beginning of the 1990's the 
state controlled media has been one of the key pillars of the regime, 
playing a crucial role in abetting the rule of Milosevic and the SPS. 
Those media are important means of formulating and directing public 
opinion by vigorously promoting each action of the regime and 
deflecting any criticism of its policies. Purges of staff members who 
resisted external involvement into editorial and personnel policies 
enabled Milosevic's regime to acquire absolute control over those 
media.67 
On the other hand, the independent media critically oriented toward the 
regime68 has been continually harassed and hindered in its normal work 
by the government. Consequently, the independent media has never 
managed to expand its audience state-wide, and its influence was, and 
still is, primarily local (mostly concentrated in and around the capital of 
Yugoslavia, Belgrade). Besides persistent propaganda against the 
independent media conducted through the state-controlled media,69 the 
regime has used numerous other means aimed at obstructing and 
66. See also Dimitrije Boarov, Zahtev lJl samodefinisanje [Request for Self-definition], VREME 
no. 469, 22-26, 1 January 2000; Milena Putnik, Political Scene of Vojvodina: Searching for the 
Future, AIM Podgorica, 9 December 1999. 
67. For an illustration, see MARK THOMPSON, FORGING WAR, 22-24, 45-46, 64, 79-83, 125 
(University of Luton Press, Luton, 1999). See also ANEM press release: Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia: A State of Repression (May 1999), which quotes that in one of the cleansings that were 
executed in RTS (Radio-Television of Serbia, the most important among the pro-regime media), in 
one month only (January 1993) some 150(), staff members were fired from the RTS for not agreeing 
with the editorial policy of that station. Available (in English) on Internet at 
<http://www.freeb92.netimedia/repressioni>. 
68. The phrase "critically oriented independent media" is used to make a distinction with 
another group of privately owned media oriented towards entertainment programs, without news 
programs or programs with political contents. 
69. For instance, from the early 1990's the independent media were officially stigmatized as 
being "anti-Serbian," "anti-state," "non-patriotic," "seditious," "fascist," "internal enemies of Serbia 
and all the Serbs;" they were accused of being "on the payrolls" of foreign intelligence services and 
foes with the task to disseminate lies and anti-Serb propaganda, and the like. 
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silencing it.70 Some of those methods are extra-legal (physical and even 
armed attacks against journalists, ransacks of the independent media's 
premises and equipment),71 and many serious indications exist that the 
regime is behind them. Others are legal, or based on arbitrary 
application of certain legal acts. 
One of the legal instruments in use is the Criminal Code, particularly 
provisions concerning criminal liability for offenses committed by· the 
media contained in the federal code of 1977,72 and those concerning 
defamation and disseminating false information contained in the Serbian 
code of the same year.73 A number of lawsuits for defamation have been 
filed against journalists, most of whom work for the independent media. 
Typically, the plaintiffs were politicians, usually in public office.74 
However, this mechanism proved to be unsuitable for achieving desired 
long-term effects, such as elimination of a particular medium or re-
direction of its editorial policy. The defendants had the option of usin1s 
certain legal defenses (e.g. truth, fair comment, certain immunities), 5 
which made the final outcome less certain. Moreover, the procedural 
requirements and guarantees included in the federal Criminal Proceeding 
Act prolonged the duration of such proceedings (in some cases for 
70. See The Outline of the State Repression over Independent Media (including the media in 
the Albanian language, in Kosovo) in the ANEM press release Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: A 
State of Repression (May 1999) on Internet at <http://www.freeb92.net/media/repression/>. 
71. The most notorious and tragic incident of the kind occurred on 11 April 1999, when 
Slavko Curuvija, the owner and editor-in-chief of two independent dailies, was assassinated while 
returning home. See also FREEB92 NEWS 16, 17 January 2000, Internet issue at 
<http://www.freeb92.net/archive/s/>. For other examples see MARK THOMPSON, FORGING WAR, 60 
(University of Luton Press, Luton, 1999). 
72. CRIMINAL CODE OF FRY, art. 27-29. 
73. CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REpUBLIC OF SERBIA, art. 92, and related art. 96-101 
(defamation), and art. 218 (disseminating false information). In relation to the recent convictions 
under the said art. 218, see ANEM press releases: RSF Asks for TV Soko Director Neboja Ristic's 
Release (17 August 1999); Journalist Summoned to Begin Prison Sentence (20 July 1999); TV Soko 
Closed Again; Ristic Imprisonment Upheld; Ministry Threatens Charges for Licence Fee Defaulters 
(27 June 1999); TV Soko Editor Imprisoned (27 April 1999). ANEM press releases (in English) are 
available on Internet at <http://www.freeb92.net/media/repression/>. 
74. The Serbian Criminal Code, as well as the Montenegrin, provide a heightened level of 
protection from defamation to publi~ officials - the prescribed punishment for that felony is more 
severe than for cases where the injured party is a private individual, and spans from three months to 
three years imprisonment. This concept is completely opposite to the one accepted by the European 
Court of Human Rights, that politicians knowingly lay themselves open to close scrutiny, and thus 
must display a higher degree of tolerance (Lingens case of july 8, 1986,7 HRU 307 (1986», or to 
the US doctrine, which since the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) adds an 
additional requirement for "public officials" as plaintiffs - to prove that the defamatory statement 
contained the element of "actual malice" (extended later in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 
130 (1967), and in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971». 
75. CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REpUBLIC OF SERBIA, arts. 92, 96. 
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years), and to some extent enabled the defendants to use fair trial 
guarantees for their benefit. Largely because of these reasons, most 
cases brought under these provisions have never been decided on the 
merits by the courts, but were terminated for procedural reasons, or 
because the plaintiff withdrew the suit. 
Similar or even less effective outcomes have been reached when 
journalists are sued for misdemeanors, as provided by statute. Whereas 
fines, as typical penalties for misdemeanors, are limited to amounts 
prescribed by law, the judicial procedure for misdemeanors contains all 
the basic guarantees of criminal procedure. 
Until the end of the 1980's little of the media in Yugoslavia was 
privately owned, but was usually founded by the state, its organs, or 
various para-state organizations, and was deemed "property of society." 
Some of the most prominent independent media has been gradually 
destroyed and/or taken over by the regime's use of various tactics, 
usually illegal or based on arbitrary interpretations of certain provisions. 
In some cases, various legal or contractual provisions concerning 
ownership rights of the media have been invoked by the state in order to 
seize or ban the media. 
In most of these cases the media's foundation was based on vague, 
unclear, . or controversial formulations, and sometimes no legal or 
contractual traces concerning ownership rights existed. When it finally 
became legal for individuals and non-governmental entities to run the 
media, employees or individuals legally acquired the majority of shares 
or ownership of some of the already existing media. Later some of the 
most prominent independent media was simply taken over by the regime, 
which claimed that ownership rights still belonged to the state as the 
original founder of the respective medium, or that acquisition of the 
particular medium was illegal.76 
76. This was the way the daily "BORBA," the TV station "Studio B," and other smaller papers 
and electronic media were taken over by the state during the last decade. For more details on the 
cases of "BORBA" and "Studio B" see MARK THOMPSON, FORGING WAR, 46-48, 125-126 
(University of Luton Press, Luton, 1999). The most recent case, which is still pending before the 
court, was the take over of one of the most prominent independent radio stations, B92, by the 
government in March 1999 during the NATO bombardments. The entire crew had left and 
continued working under the name FREEB92, as a third program of Studio B, another radio station. 
See Higher Commercial Court Dismisses B92 Appeal (ANEM and Radio B92 press release, August 
16, 1999); Legal Proceedings for the Protection of Radio B92 - Chronology (ANEM press release, 
24 March 1999). ANEM press releases (in English) are on Internet at 
<http://www.freeb92.netlmediaJrepressionl>. 
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Another mechanism in use has been directed solely towards the 
electronic media in Yugoslavia - licensing procedures and fees for use 
of broadcast frequencies. Since 1991, allocation of frequencies has been 
under the jurisdiction of the Republics.77 Between 1994 and 1998, 
tenders for allocating frequencies were not held, although the law orders 
they be held once a year. During those years a number of new electronic 
media began work without a license for broadcasting. 
In May 1997, the Federal Ministry of Telecommunications declared that 
all broadcasters had to obtain licenses within a month or cease 
broadcasting. The media then faced a problem invented to allow 
authorities to be rid of independent media critical of the regime. Under 
the Serbian Act on Public Information, broadcasters can be registered 
only if they have already obtained a license, yet one of the Ministry's 
requirements for obtaining a license was that the media already be 
registered. Fifty five of the smaller media were ordered to close down. 
At the end of July, the Ministry suspended those closing orders until the 
end of November due to the ongoing campaign for presidential and 
parliamentary elections in Serbia. 
In March 1998 the federal Ministry of Information announced the tender 
for assigning temporary frequencies to the electronic media for the 
territory of Serbia without stating the relevant legal grounds. Even 
media with long-term contracts for use of their frequencies with state-
owned radio and TV station were required to participate in the 
competition as if no contracts existed.78 Terms and procedures for 
competing for frequencies were vague and subject to arbitrary 
interpretation. Many elements had no grounds in existing legal acts. 
Although the announcement declared that certain amounts would have to 
be paid for the use of frequencies, those amounts were announced for the 
first time only three days before publication of final results. The results 
were disastrous: of 425 radio and TV stations in competition, only 247 
were assigned frequencies for broadcasting their programs. Except for 
77. Such a solution is contrary to the Federal Constitution and relevant laws, as well as to 
relevant international conventions. 
78. The most probable motivation for such a move was that the regime in Serbia used the net 
of local governments to found and control the local media. After the elections for local governments 
in Serbia at the end of 1996, the regime lost control in all major cities in Serbia, where the coalition 
of opposition parties won. Consequently, the opposition gained control over the media owned by the 
local governments. Therefore, the primary goal of the tender was to regain control over the media, 
this time by the federal government, that is, by its Ministry of Information. 
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three members of the Association of Independent Electronic Media 
(ANEM), all other members of this association were denied frequencies. 
In addition, monthly amounts required to be paid by the stations for use 
of a frequency were extremely high, reportedly about 180,000 Yugoslav 
dinars (over $16,000 by the official exchange rate) per month.79 Those 
that cannot pay this amount can be ordered to stop broadcasting. This 
allows the regime to "tolerate" their broadcasts without paying for use of 
a frequency, in exchange for less critical reporting on issues related to 
the regime. Under existing difficult economic· circumstances80 hardly 
any independent media can afford to pay that much for a license.8l Most 
of the media does not pay, at least not those amounts, and are thus under 
constant threat from authorities to close them down. Authorities have 
actually closed down or harassed some of the media for this reason.82 
B. THE ACT ON PUBLIC INFORMATION OF THE REpUBLIC OF SERBIA 
(OCTOBER 1998) 
Another action of the regime directed against freedom of the press was 
the enactment of the new Act on Public Information of the Republic of 
Serbia in October 1998, which repealed the previous Act of the same 
name. The need for "adequate regulation" of public information had 
been announced many times by authorities, but the media, not being in a 
position to influence the new Act, expected it to be very restrictive. Two 
drafts of the statute were released in the last few years, and both were 
heavily criticized by scholars, lawyers, and the independent media, but 
the objections were not the reason the drafts never reached the Assembly. 
Still, the version that was finally enacted is even more restrictive and 
violative of freedom of the press than the previous drafts.83 
79. The amount cited is according to Uros Komlenovic, Kalil Ferman za ANEM (Katil Ferman 
for ANEM), VREME, no. 395, May 16, 1998. 
80. Current average monthly salary in Yugoslavia is around $35 (January 2000) by the black 
market rate, or around $200 by the official rate. 
8!. Those controlled by the government are either financed or largely subsidized from the state 
budget. 
82. For more details see: supra note 62, at 125; see also VREME, no. 395, May 16, 1998; 
ANEM press releases: Exorbitant Fee Demand For Radio Pancevo (September 16, 1999); 
Outrageous Fee Demand For Radio Pancevo (July 13,1999); TV Soko Closed Again; Ristic 
Imprisonment Upheld; Ministry Threatens Charges for Licence Fee Defaulters (June 27, 1999); 
Yugoslav Telecommunications Ministry Continues Shutdown of ANEM Affiliate Broadcasters; 
fudependent Newspaper Fined (24 June 1999). ANEM press releases (in English) are on futernet at 
<http://www.freeb92.netlmedia/repressioni>. 
83. An important reason for passing this Act was that the number of independent media have 
increased greatly in the last few years. Despite the fact that most of them have only local influence 
(due to low circulation of printed media and low range transmitters of electronic media), their 
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The Act was passed on October 2084 in an extraordinary session of the 
Serbian Assembly convened three days earlier, and only a few days after 
NATO's threats to intervene in Yugoslavia were (temporarily, as later 
events demonstrated) eliminated.85 As proposed by the Government of 
Serbia which submitted the draft, it was enacted in an urgent procedure. 
Representatives were handed the text of the draft at the beginning of the 
session, and the Act was enacted at its end.86 To aid in enforcing the 
penalties in the Act on Public Information, the Assembly also enacted an 
amendment to the Serbian Act on Misdemeanors87 by inserting a short 
new provision (new section 4 of Article 33) which reads: "Higher fines 
may be passed for misdemeanors in the area of public information." 
Before entering into analysis of this Act, it should be stressed that the 
organs which decide misdemeanors, although called "courts for 
misdemeanors," are not judicial but administrative bodies. Their 
"judges" are appointed and dismissed by the Serbian government, and 
this fact reveals much about their independence and impartiality. 
numbers allowed larger audiences to learn information never publicized in the state controlled 
media. Besides, several independent dailies (DNEVNl TELEGRAF, GLAS JA VNOSTI, DANAS, Bue --
the first was forced to cease work after two huge fines under this Act in 45 days, while each of the 
three others has been fined several times so far, and is constantly struggling with financial problems 
because of that) placed in jeopardy the long lasting monopoly of the media under the regime's 
control. 
84. Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 36/1998. The text of the Act, in English, can be 
found on Internet at <http://www.freeb92.comlmediallegalrepressionlindex.html>. 
85. Earlier in October two other steps were taken by the Serbian Government announcing this 
Act. On October 5, Serbian Ministry of Information issued a warning to the media to stop 
rebroadcasting programs produced by the "services for the propaganda and psychological war of 
Western powers" (which actually meant news programs produced by broadcasters in the specified 
states). Failure to conform with the warning would be punished, although the punishment was not 
specified. Three days later, the Serbian government issued the Decree on Special Measures During 
the Threat of NATO Military Intervention Against Our Country. It prohibited the airing of foreign 
programs which spread "fear, panic, defeatism, or undermine the readiness of citizens to fight for the 
preservation of the integrity of the Republic of Serbia and of FRY." The Decree also provided that 
domestic media must not publicize programs or articles that spread defeatism, or that are contrary to 
the resolutions passed by the Federal and Serbian Assemblies. The punishment for violations of 
these provisions was a temporary ban on their activity, and confiscation of their property (by 
comparison, the confiscation of property as a punishment for felonies was abolished by amendments 
to the FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE in 1990). On October 13, on the basis of the Decree, three 
newspapers (DANAS, NASA BORBA, and DNEVNl TELEGRAF) were closed down by police. The 
Government withdrew its Decree after the Act on Public Information was enacted. See Constitution 
Watch - Update on Yugoslavia, 7 E. EUR. CaNST. REv. 78 no.4 (Fall 1998) available on Internet at 
<http://www.law.nyu.eduJeecr/>. 
86. For more details on the procedure in the Assembly, which is typical of its work in the 
1990's, see id. at 79. 
87. Official Gazette of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, 44/1989; Official Gazette of the 
Republic of Serbia, 2111990,1111992,6,20,53,6711993; 28/1994; and 16,37/1997. 
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The Serbian Act on Public Information contains numerous provisions 
that are invalid as contrary to the positive law of Yugoslavia and Serbia 
and the provisions of various international instruments accepted 
worldwide. Although formally proclaiming that "public information is 
free" and "inviolable," and that "no one has the right to illegally restrict 
it or forcefully influence the work of public information services,,,88 the 
Act violates not only the principles related to freedom of expression and 
of the press, but also key elements of the concepts of fair trial, due 
process, and equality of all subjects under the law. Its deficiencies are 
overwhelming, and can be found in the provisions that set up general 
rules, as well as in those dealing with technical details. The failures of 
this Act are so numerous that only the most flagrant will be briefly 
discussed below. 
1. Prior Restraints 
A group of its provisions prescribes the circumstances and procedures for 
imposing prior restraints on the media, and preventing distribution of 
certain information. The Act prescribes that distribution of press and 
other means of public information calling for the forced overthrow of the 
constitutional order, jeopardizing the territorial integrity of the Republic 
of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, violating guaranteed 
freedoms and rights of citizens, or stirs national, racial or religious 
, intolerance and hatred can be prevented by court order.89 The restraining 
order is to be issued by a competent court within six hours of receipt of a 
petition by the public prosecutor authorized to proceed in the case 
(printers or publishers must deliver three copies of each publication to 
the authorized public attorney immediately upon printing),90 who may 
propose adoption of an order if he finds a basis for initiating criminal 
proceedings for a criminal act prosecuted ex officio. 91 
The court must deliver the temporary order banning the distribution to 
the founder, publisher, or printer immediately, and order the seizure of 
all copies of the news or other means of public information by competent 
authorities of internal affairs.92 The court must hold a hearing on the 
public prosecutor's petition within three days of its receipt.93 The court 
may hold hearings and decide the petition even if the invited parties fail 
88. Act on Public Information of the Republic of Serbia, art. I, §§ I, 2. 
89, [d. art. 42, § I. 
90. [d. art. 26, § 2. 
91. [d. art. 42, §§ 2, 3. 
92. [d, art. 43. 
93. [d. art. 44, § I. 
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to appear at the hearing, to which they will receive an invitation.94 Each 
party may appeal the decision in the first instance to the court of the 
second instance within three days from the delivery of the decision.95 
Reasons for the prior restraints enumerated in the Act are identical to 
those listed in the Serbian (as well as the Yugoslav) Constitution,96 and 
are constitutional on their face. However, the Act is not specific as to 
constitutional formulations, which are too general to be directly 
implemented in particular cases. In order to comply with statutory 
requirements, particularly if followed by a punishment, an individual 
must be able to determine exactly what is ordered or prohibited. The 
language of the Act's prevision, however, fails to describe the punishable 
offenses with sufficient accuracy. Consequently, the provision in the Act 
on Public Information is too vague, since it enables the public prosecutor 
to ban distribution in a wide range of situations completely covering the 
area of "political speech." 
For committing a misdemeanor under Article 42, section 1 (see supra at 
the beginning of this section), the founder and publisher are also to be 
fined from 400,000 to 800,000 YU dinars, while parties responsible to 
the founder, the publisher, and the editor in chief are to be fined from 
100,000 to 400,000 YU dinars.97 
2. The Banning of Foreign Broadcasts 
The Act also bans transmission or re-transmission of foreign radio and 
TV broadcasts of a "political propaganda nature" produced by foreign 
broadcast organizations founded by foreign governments or their 
organizations, except for delayed programs shown on the basis of 
reciprocity determined by inter-state agreement.98 Again, the language of 
the provision is far too vague. The key phrase is "political propaganda 
nature," grounds for a penalty, but the Act does not define those terms. 
"Forbidden" information may include anything that deals with political 
issues, as well as a variety of other issues. 
Whether there is "reciprocity determined by an inter-state agreement" is 
a matter that cannot be determined by a broadcaster or even by a team of 
94. [d. art. 44, § 2. 
95. [d. art. 48, § 1. 
96. CONSTITUTION OF SERBIA, art. 46, § 6 (and CONST. OF FRY, art. 38) - explicitly 
prohibiting censorship, and enumerating reasons that justify prior restraint on a medium. 
97. Act on Public Information of the Republic of Serbia, art. 67. 
98. [d. art. 27. 
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its legal experts, but only by an authorized state body, namely, the 
Government, and its Ministry for Foreign Affairs in particular. This 
way, broadcasters are deprived of the opportunity to make free editorial 
choices when it comes to foreign programs. This solution effectively 
empowers the state and its administrative authorities to decide which 
foreign broadcasts will be included in the inter-state agreement. Having 
the power to decide what information cannot be broadcast is to have utter 
control over circulation of information from abroad. Thus, the range of 
information available to citizens is hugely restricted, and subject to 
arbitrary decisions. 
Yet another element of prior censorship by the state is made legal, 
namely, censorship of information produced abroad, by the state's choice 
of information allowed for publication in Yugoslavia, which is also in 
violation of the explicit prohibition of censorship found in the Serbian 
Constitution (see note 94, supra). 
According to the Serbian (and federal) Constitutions,99 only a competent 
court of law may establish whether any of the enumerated reasons for 
prohibiting distribution of the news and dissemination of other 
information exist in a particular case. Conduct which results in 
restricting distribution also constitute a misdemeanor under article 27 of 
the Act. However, no such decision 'of the court is required in cases 
under article 27, which means that an explicit constitutional procedural 
requirement is not met. 
Moreover, the provision of article 27 conflicts with the provision of 
another article of the Act, which proclaims that the public media may 
freely present facts and opinions on everything of interest to citizens, and 
that everyone has the right to be informed on matters of public interest. loo 
For the reasons stated above, the restrictions introduced by article 27 
greatly limit the freedom of the media to present facts and opinions of 
public interest, as well as the public's "right to know." 
The Act prescribes penalties for misdemeanors constituting a violation of 
this article. The fine prescribed is 250,000 - 500,000 YU dinars for the 
founder and the publisher, and 50,000-150,000 YU dinars for the editor-
in-chief and the party responsible to the founder and publisher. lOl 
99. CONST. OF FRY, art. 38; CONSTITUTION OF SERBIA, art. 46, § 6. 
100. Act on Public Infonnation of the Republic of Serbia, art. 3. 
101. [d. art. 68. 
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3. Misdemeanors 
The Act contains other provisions describing misdemeanors in the area 
of public information subject to punishment under the Act. For instance, 
the public media must inform the public "truthfully, timely, and 
completely," while publicizing lies in the public media represents an 
abuse of freedom public information.102 The criteria of this provision are 
vague, particularly that requiring information to be "complete." Since 
there are no fIrm grounds to decide if these requirements are met, their 
content is subject to various interpretations and depends on the 
circumstances of each particular case. This promotes arbitrariness and 
introduces legal uncertainty. 
The Act also provides that "a public media may not publicize or 
reproduce information, articles or facts which violate the honor and 
dignity of the individual, or contain insulting expressions and rude 
words." 103 The language of this provision does not state that the 
incriminating information must be untrue, or whether the correct 
information should be punished. This formulation is too broad. For this 
misdemeanor, the founder and publisher may be fIned from 100,000 to 
3000,000 YU dinars, while the editor-in-chief and the party responsible 
to the founder and publisher may be fined from 5,000 to 150,000 YU 
dinars. 104 
4. Fines 
The fInes discussed above, as well as others not mentioned, are 
outrageous. The maximum fIne prescribed in the Act on Public 
Information amounts to 800,000 YU dinars (over $70,000 by the official 
exchange rate). Several points need to be highlighted in this respect. 
The amendment introducing the fines does not specify the maximum to 
be prescribed as a fIne for misdemeanors in the area of public 
information, and is therefore defIcient, and contrary to an explicit 
provision of the Act on Misdemeanors which prescribes maximum fines 
to be imposed for misdemeanors - 1,000 YU dinars for individuals, and 
10,000 YU dinars for companies. The amended provision is a general 
one that applies to all misdemeanors, so exceptions should be based on 
fIrm reasons, and should be proportional to general penalties. However, 
102. [d. art. 4. 
103. [d. art. 11, § 2. 
104. [d. art. 69. 
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the highest penalties set for misdemeanors in the area of public 
information are much greater than general maximum fines. 
Moreover, the amounts in the Act on Public Information are much higher 
than the maximum financial punishments prescribed for felonies in the 
federal Criminal Code - 50,000 YU dinars, that is 200,000 YU dinars for 
felonies committed with intent to obtain personal gain. Since 
misdemeanors are defined as the lightest forms of offense, it is only 
logical that the highest fines for misdemeanors do not exceed fines 
prescribed for felonies. This puts the legal definition of misdemeanors to 
a serious test, or at least questions whether the "misdemeanors" 
prescribed in the Act on Public Information really qualify as 
misdemeanors. 
Another question is whether the prescribed fines are proportional to the 
wrong done by committing a misdemeanor under the. Act on Public 
Information. In the current economic setting in Yugoslavia, these 
amounts exceed the financial ability of most of the independent media. 
Imposition of such a fine means severe financial burden for the 
misdemeanant, sometimes even too large (so far at least two major 
dailies, Dnevni Telegraf and Evropljanin, and several smaller papers had 
to cease work for this reason). Such forceful destruction of a media is 
undoubtedly an unjust and disproportionate punishment for offenses set 
forth in the Act. 
Under the Act on Misdemeanors, if a fine is not paid, a court may 
transform the fine into a sentence of imprisonment according to a 
formula prescribed by the Act. If this formula were applied to 
individuals under the Act on Public Information, the maximum prison 
sentence would be greater than the maximum prison sentence prescribed 
by the federal criminal code (20 years), and far greater than the 
maximum prison sentence derived from the fine under the Act on 
Misdemeanors. 
Setting such high penalties under the Act on Public Information will 
undoubtedly have a chilling effect, and will result in self-censorship 
within the system of public information in Yugoslavia with all attendant 
negative consequences. For all the reasons stated above, the Act on 
Public Information seriously challenges the constitutionality of the 
amendment to the Act on Misdemeanors, as well as the penalty 
provisions contained in the Act on Public Information. 
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5. Violations of Procedural Due Process 
Like the Act on Misdemeanors, the Act on Public Information prescribes 
that the (federal) Act on Criminal Proceedings applies unless stated 
otherwise in the Act on Public Information. 105 The latter includes special 
rules of procedure in articles 72-74 that contravene nearly all the 
procedural guarantees of due process. 
The Act prescribes that the court hold urgent proceedings in cases of 
violation of public information.106 The court of first instance must 
schedule an oral hearing for misdemeanors prescribed in articles 67 
through 69 of the Act within 24 hours from submission to the COurt.107 
The Act does not require personal delivery of a summons for the oral 
hearing to the defendant, but instead prescribes delivery to a person 
designated to receive written correspondence for the defendant, or to an 
employee on the business premises of the founder, publisher, printer. If 
such delivery cannot be made, the summons is to be "nailed" to the door, 
which is considered lawful delivery. If even that delivery cannot be 
made, a summons is to be made through the system of public 
information, which is deemed lawful and prompt delivery. lOS 
By the end of the hearing, the defendant must prove that the released 
information is true. If he does not, it is presumed a misdemeanor has 
been committed.109 If the defendant is absent for any reason, the court is 
authorized to reach a decision. 110 The court must end the legal 
proceedings within 24 hours of delivery of the summons. lll An appeal 
does not suspend enforcement of the decision. 1 12 
These provisions are a blatant violation of nearly all elements of the due 
process principle. Allowing for indirect delivery of a summons, and 
beginning a case so quickly, does not afford a defendant time to prepare 
his defense. Instead of the presumption of innocence, the Act brings in 
the presumption of guilt - the defendant has to prove, under detrimental 
circumstances, the truth of the published information. The burden is 
solely on the defendant. Failing to meet the burden of proof leads to the 
105. Id. art. 49. 
106. Id. art. I, § 3. 
107. Id. art. 72, §§ 1,2. 
108. Id. art. 72, §§ 3,4. 
109. Id. art. 72, § 5. 
110. Id. art. 72, § 6. 
111. Id. art. 72, § 7. 
112. Id. art. 72, § 8. 
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presumption that the defendant committed the alleged misdemeanor. 
The case may be decided even in a defendant's absence, without the 
possibility for later justification of his absence. Finally, an appeal does 
not suspend enforcement of the decision. Although some of these 
provisions are common for certain media offenses (those regarding the 
burden of proof in libel cases), the whole setting is designed so that a 
defendant can hardly avoid punishment. 
Fines must be paid within 24 hours of the decision. Delivery of the 
decision is made the same way as delivery of the invitation to the oral 
hearing (see supra). If the 24 hour deadline for the payment is missed,. 
payment is enforced by the state.113 In the latter case, compulsory 
payment by the founder or publisher is made by transferring funds from 
their accounts to the Budget of Serbia. If those funds do not cover the 
amount of the fine (which is not unlikely), the Act prescribes that capital 
assets used in the work of the media, and, if needed, all printed matters 
as well, are to be seized and sold at public auction within seven days of 
seizure.1l4 
As to the editor-in-chief and the "responsible person," enforcement is to 
be executed first on their personal accounts. If the funds on those 
accounts are not sufficient to cover the whole amount of the fine, then . 
enforcement is to be executed on their personal assets (including real 
estate), which will be seized and sold at public auction within seven days 
of seizure. 
The provisions on the procedure for misdemeanors and enforcement of 
decisions made in those procedures violate the rights of the accused 
guaranteed in several articles of the Serbian Constitution 115 and 
incorporated in all (federal or Serbian) acts in force which regulate 
various judicial and administrative procedures. 
Other provisions of the Act on Public Information depart from accepted 
standards for the media, or at least prescribe some peculiar solutions. 
These are: provisions concerning right to reply and correction (which 
113. [d. art. 73, §§ 1-3. 
114. [d. art. 74, §§ 1-3. 
115. In particular, Art. 22 (guaranteeing the right to equal protection of one's own rights in 
procedures before courts, other state agencies, or any other agency or organization, and the right to 
appeal or to apply another legal remedy against a decision concerning one's legally founded right or 
interest); Art. 23, sec. 3 (presumption of innocence in judicial procedures); and Art. 24 (right to 
defense, and prohibition to any court or agency authorized to conduct proceedings to punish anyone 
not given an opportunity to defend oneself). 
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exceed limits determined by both Serbian and Yugoslav 
Constitutions)!!6; those regulating rights of parties to whom the 
information relates (the scope and contents of which is also potentially 
detrimental to the free dissemination of information)!!7; the provision 
establishing a supervisory body with the power to initiate charges against 
the media (with no mechanisms for ensuring its impartiality and 
independence from the government's political controli !8; the one 
prohibiting re-release of information determined as a criminal act by an 
effective decision of a court, except when publicizing the court's 
decision upon its order (with a possible chilling effect on reporting of 
legal issues)1l9; some related to registration of the media!20; the lack of 
provisions that would require higher standards for public officials than 
for private individuals in proceedings under the Act (with a probable 
chilling effect on critical reporting about public officials).121 
In addition, the media and its editors, owners, managers, and printers, 
have been fined in several cases for verbatim publication of statements of 
opposition political parties and individuals, even when the reports were 
fair and accurate.122 
Besides violating internal legal acts, the model constructed by the Act on 
Public Information violates the relevant provlSlons of related 
international documents. In particular, these are articles 6 (due process 
clause) and 10 (freedom of expression) of the [European] Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR); 
article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and article 19 
116. Act on Public Infonnation of the Republic of Serbia, art. 37-41. 
117. Id. art. 55-60. 
118. Id. art. 65-66. 
119. Id. art. 31. 
120. /d. art. 12-23. 
121. Several legal analyses of the Act on Public Information have been completed 
both inland and abroad during the fIrst year of the Act's application. They concentrate on 
various problems imminent to the Act, from different angles. The unanimous conclusion 
of those analyses is the same as the one suggested here. For a legal analysis on 
compliance of the Act on Public Information with the ECHR, see ANDREW NICOL, 
EXPERT OPINION ON THE SERBIAN PUBLIC INFORMATION LAW (1998) (Council of Europe, 
Strasbourg, 19 November 1998). See also COVINGTON & BURLING, LEGAL ANALYSIS OF 
THE SERBIAN LAW ON PUBLIC INFORMATION (Washington, 1998). All these analyses can 
be found on Internet at <http://www.freeb92.netJmediallegalrepressionlindex.html>. See 
also Article 19 (The International Centre Against Censorship), MEMORANDUM ON THE 
REpUBLIC OF SERBIA PUBLIC INFORMATION LAW (London, November 1998). 
122. See FREEB92, News for 26,27 Oct. and 8, 9 Dec. 1999; See also: HELSINKI COMMl1TEE 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA, Report on Intensified Repression in Serbia, VREME no. 467, at 33, 
18 December 1999 (on the case against dailies BLIC, DANAS, AND GLAS JAvNOSTI). 
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of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (both related 
to freedom of expression). 
On October 27, 1998, the Association of the Independent Electronic 
Media (ANEM) filed an initiative to the Serbian Constitutional Court for 
examination of the constitutionality of the 1998 Act on Public 
Information of Serbia, which is still pending.123 It focuses on some of the 
shortcomings of the Act mentioned here, as well as others. In particular, 
the initiative challenges the constitutionality of articles 27 and 67-74 of 
the Act on Public Information, and of the amendment to the Act on 
Misdemeanors. 
In December 1999, coalition "Vojvodina" submitted a motion in the 
Serbian Parliament, demanding a discussion on the repeal of the Public 
Information Act. The Act was described by the head of the coalition as 
an "instrument of state terror," and a'''violation of basic legal standards." 
The motion was dismissed after deputies from the ruling coalition voted 
against it. 124 
The 1998 Serbian Public Information Act is a clear example of a 
repressive piece. of legislation, the aim of wl).ich is to legalize 
discretionary and unrestrained repression of the media. The provisions 
of the Act form a peculiar system of censorship, combining forms of 
prior restraint, and subsequent punishment with a potential chilling 
effect, making this law on media look rather like a law against the 
media. The Act blatantly negates freedom of expression and the press by 
establishing a system designed to enable the regime to exercise absolute 
control over the flow of information, and to allow elimination of every 
independent source that does not follow the dictatorial rules set up in the 
Act. Much of the independent media in Yugoslavia has been prosecuted 
under the Act, and some have been forced to terminate their work. 12S 
123. The full text of the constitutional complaint (in English) can be found on futernet at 
<http://www.freeb92.netlmediallegalrepressionlindex.html>. 
124. See FREEB92, News for 21 Dec. 1999. On internet at 
<http://www.freeb92.net/archive/e/>. 
125. For information on the cases tried under the Act see VLADO MARES, MUZZLING THE 
MEOlA (Institute For War & Peace, 1 October 1999, Belgrade). See also ANEM's press releases: 
INDEPENDENT RADIO BREAK-IN As MEDIA REPRESSION STEPS UP, and ANEM PROTESTS 
STRONGLY (l3 September 1999); MAGAZINE FINED 150,000 DINARS (17 August 1999); YUGOSLAV 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MINISTRY CONTINUES SHUTDOWN OF ANEM AFFILIATE BROADCASTERS; 
INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER FiNED (24 June 1999). All texts referred to in the footnote can be found 
on futernet (in English) at <http://www.freeb92.netlmedialrepressionl>. See also HELSINKI 
COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA, Repon on Intensified Repression in Serbia, VREME no. 
467, at 30-36, 18 December 1999; ALEKSANDAR CIRIC, Vreme Bira Presudu Godine (Vreme's 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Seventy nine days of bombing Yugoslavia by NATO in the first half of 
1999, as could easily have been foreseen, did not change the essence of 
the autocratic regime - at least not for the better. To the contrary, it 
harmed mostly the opponents of the regime. A state of war proclaimed 
because of the aggression gave the regime an excuse to intensify the 
already harsh repression, not only against Kosovar Albanians, but against 
all who had openly opposed the regime, and in many respects against the 
better part of the population. 
In these extraordinary circumstances, repression continued through 
vigorous governmental activity by passing numerous decrees and other 
regulations.126 The federal government enacted 77 decrees, decisions, 
and other by-laws, while the Serbian president and government enacted 
16 decrees that suspended or severely restricted various constitutionally 
guaranteed rights and liberties. 
Between the beginning and the end of the war, the Assemblies of 
Yugoslavia and Serbia each convened several times. However, the 
decrees passed during that time were never discussed, nor were they 
approved or repealed by the Assembly, as provided by the Constitutions. 
The Serbian Ministry of Information issued instructions the media in the 
state of an immediate threat of war the day NATO's attacks began, 
which set the criteria for reporting on all the events during the state of 
war. 
Choice a/the Sentence a/the Year), VREME nos. 468, 25 December 1999,469, at 12-14, 1 January 
2000, and 470, at 18-21,8 January 2000. 
126. Art. 99, sec. 1111 of the Federal Constitution authorizes the government to regulate by its 
own acts matters within the jurisdiction of the Federal Assembly when the assembly is not able to 
convene during the state of war, after asking the president of the Assembly'S chambers for an 
opinion. If adopted during a state of war, such regulations may restrict rights and freedoms of the 
citizens until such state lasts. Certain rights, enumerated in the same article, are exempted from 
restrictions even during the state of war. The federal government must seek approval for those 
measures of the Federal Assembly as soon as it is able to convene. 
The Serbian Constitution, in art. 83, sec. 117, confers similar powers on the President of the 
Republic. During a state of war, the President is authorized to enact, at his own initiative, 
regulations that relate to matters within the jurisdiction of the Serbian National Assembly. He has to 
submit them to the Assembly for approval as soon as it can convene. Unlike the Federal and 
Montenegrin Constitutions, which enumerate rights and liberties that cannot be restricted even 
during the state of war, the Serbian Constitution includes no such limitation -- it plainly provides that 
by enactments promulgated during a state of war, some freedoms and rights of man and citizen may 
be restricted, and the organization, composition and powers of the Government and of the ministries, 
courts of law, and public prosecutor's offices may be altered. 
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Military censorship was introduced and immediately enforced, and the 
independent media carne under open attack by the regime. Some 
branches of the media were banned, some were taken over by the 
government (such as radio B92, see supra), some decided to stop work 
temporarily, and some continued to work against their editorial policy. 
All army conscripts between the ages of 18 and 60 were prohibited from 
traveling abroad. Numerous provisions of the Act on Criminal 
Procedure were temporarily altered or suspended, giving police wider 
authority and restricting due process guarantees. Unless organized by 
authorities, public gatherings were prohibited. The Decree on Internal 
Affairs During the State of War allowed for deportation of all who 
endangered Serbia's defense capabilities for up to 60 days, without a 
court warrant. 127 
Two weeks after the attacks ended, the Federal Assembly declared the 
end of the state of war and repealed the governmental decrees, while the 
Serbian Assembly hesitated to do so. Some of the decrees were later 
abolished, while others were enacted as regular legislation of Serbia. 
In his analysis, Nenad Dimitrijevic postulates the survival of the regime 
would probably mean a slide toward military dictatorship and its 
stabilization for some time. The fall of Milosevic, on the other hand, 
could open the possibility for a change toward democracy. In the latter 
case, how the regime was changed would influence future developments. 
Violent overthrow would increase the risk of struggle for power without 
legal and institutional mechanisms to control it, and might lead to a new 
127. Texts of some of the decrees and other regulations issued by the governments of 
Serbia and Yugoslavia during the state of war, and the legal analyses of these acts are 
available on Internet, at <http://www.freeb92.netimedialwar/index.shtml>. 
In particular: 
- Instructions of the Serbian Ministry of Information for the Work of the 
Media in the State of Immediate Threat of War (issued on 24 May 1999), 
and federal decrees; 
- Decree on Organizing and Fulfilling Material Obligations (Official Gazette 
of FRY, no. 36, 24 July, 1998), and Decrees on Amendments to the Decree 
on Organizing and Fulfilling Material Obligation (Official Gazette of FRY, 
no. 32, 25 April, 1999); 
- Decree on Internal Affairs During the State of-War; 
- Decree Restricting Traveling Abroad of the Yugoslav Army's Conscripts 
(Official Gazette of FRY, no. 16/99,28 March 1999); 
- Decree on the Application of the Law on Criminal Procedure in a State of 
War (Official Gazette of FRY, no. 21/99, 4 April 1999); 
- Decree on Application of the Criminal Procedure During the State of War 
(Official Gazette of FRY, no. 21/99). 
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dictatorship, or even civil war. On the other hand, if the regime were 
forced to give up its· grip on power, and if a minimum of legal and 
political continuity remained, radical changes directed toward democracy 
might resu1t. 128 
At the beginning of 2000, shared institutions of the federal state do not 
function properly. The federal arrangement is undergoing a most 
difficult test, and threatens to terminate if not modified thoroughly, and 
soon. 129 Neither the Serbian nor the federal government is able to 
effectively exercise its powers in Kosovo. A number of current Serbian 
and Yugoslav officials (including the presidents of both entities, as well 
as the Yugoslav Foreign Minister) are prohibited from entering about 
many European countries (all members of EU, and 14 other Central and 
Eastern European countries), and the USA, and are severely limited in 
performing their functions of representing the state abroad.I3O 
After two and a half months of daily unsuccessful anti-regime protests in 
Serbia, where the main demands were for the resignation of Milosevic 
and early elections on all levels, the Alliance for Change gave up those 
tactics in early December 1999, and is now taking other measures. 
Unification of the opposition since January 10, 2000 is a big step 
forward. Representatives of opposition parties have been meeting 
frequently with representatives of foreign countries (mostly the USA and 
European states) for several months now, and are recognized as partners. 
Though not in power, the opposition thus exercises some functions of 
state bodies. 
At present it is hardly possible to predict the outcome. As has been 
demonstrated in this article, both Federal and Serbian legislative bodies 
are systematically abused and are hardly functioning, while the 
administration and the judiciary are controlled by the regime. It is 
unlikely that a shift towards democracy will come from the 
128. Nenad Dimitrijevic, What Language Will We Be Speaking After the Bombs Stop Falling, I 
REe 5 (24 May 1999). Text in English available on Internet at 
<http://www.freeb92.netlcasopisJecldimitrijeviceng.htrn1>. 
129. The Montenegrin Foreign Minister stated recently that the "referendum on Montenegro's 
independence is likely." See FREEB92 News (16 October 1999), Internet issue, in English, at 
<http://www.freeb92.netlarchive!e/>. 
130. The first list of those forbidden to enter many countries contained the names of about 300 
officials and businessmen. See Constitution Watch - Update on Yugoslavia, 8 E. EUR. CONST. REv. 
38 no.3 (Summer 1999), also available on Internet at <http://www.law.nyu.eduleecr/>. Both the EU 
and USA lists were updated in November 1999 to include 597, that is 615 individuals, respectively. 
See Vladimir Milanovic, Spisak Nepozeljnih u Evropi i Americi (The List of Unwanted Ones in 
Europe and USA), VREME no.464, 27 November 1999; V. Milanovic, Novinari i Bankari· 
(Journalists and Bankers), VREME no. 466, II December 1999. 
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establishment. It is now especially difficult to believe that Milosevic 
would give up power and risk an appearance before the Hague Court. 
Another foreign military intervention, which might follow if new armed 
conflict occurs in the existing tensed situation, would only make things 
worse, with no predictable outcome. On several occasions top ranking 
army officials have explicitly stated that the army will take the side of 
the regime, if it comes to that. Any outcome, favorable or grim, still 
seems possible. 
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